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Abstract 
The Gratton (or sequential congruency) effect is the finding that conflict effects (e.g., Stroop and 
Eriksen flanker effects) are larger following congruent trials relative to incongruent trials. The 
standard account given for this is that a cognitive control mechanism detects conflict when it 
occurs and adapts to this conflict on the following trial. Others, however, have questioned the 
conflict adaptation account and suggested that sequential biases might account for the Gratton 
effect. In two experiments, contingency biases were removed from the task and stimulus 
repetitions were deleted to control for stimulus bindings. This eliminated the Gratton effect in the 
response times in both experiments, supporting a non-conflict explanation of the Gratton effect. 
A Gratton effect did persist in the errors of Experiment 1; however, this effect was not produced 
by the type of errors (word reading errors) that a conflict adaptation account should predict. 
Instead, tentative support was found for a congruency switch cost hypothesis. In all, the conflict 
adaptation account failed to account for any of the reported data. Implications for future work on 
cognitive control are discussed. 
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Now You See It, Now You Don’t: 
Controlling for Contingencies and Stimulus Repetitions Eliminates the Gratton Effect 
 Learning processes mould behaviour via knowledge about the contingency between 
(Lewicki, 1985, 1986; Schmidt, 2010; Schmidt, Crump, Cheesman, & Besner, 2007; Schmidt & 
Besner, 2008; Schmidt, De Houwer, & Besner, 2010) or sequence of (Hommel, 1998; Nissen & 
Bullemer, 1987) events we encounter in our environment. The role of cognitive control processes 
on our performance and behaviour has also been intensely studied in cognitive psychology (e.g., 
Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990; Cohen 
& Hudson, 1994; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Rabbitt, 1966). Often debate can be quite heated as 
to whether a given result reported in the literature is due to learning processes, cognitive control 
processes, or some combination of the two (e.g., see Blais & Bunge, 2010; Schmidt, 2010). One 
such result is the Gratton effect. Initially proposed as a cognitive control effect (Gratton, Coles, & 
Donchin, 1992), several researchers have challenged this view (e.g., Mayr & Awh, 2009; Mayr, 
Awh, & Laurey, 2003). This paper will present what we feel to be clear evidence that the Gratton 
effect results from non-conflict task biases (primarily contingency and stimulus repetition biases). 
Stimulus Conflict and Cognitive Control 
 Several paradigms exist for studying stimulus conflict. One of these is the Stroop task 
(Stroop, 1935; see MacLeod, 1991, for a review), in which participants typically respond slower 
and less accurately to the print colour of a colour word if the word and colour are incongruent 
(e.g., the word GREEN printed in blue; GREENblue) rather than congruent (e.g., BLUEblue). 
Similar congruency effects are observed in the Simon task (Simon & Rudell, 1967), where an 
irrelevant distracting location (e.g., left) interferes with a localized response (e.g., a right key 
press). Yet another paradigm is the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), where 
irrelevant flanking letters interfere with responding to a target letter (e.g., a distracting “b” to the 
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left and the right of a target “c”). Work with paradigms such as these demonstrates that 
unintentional processing of distracting information has an important impact on performance in 
the intended task. 
 While the impact of unintentional processes on behaviour in stimulus conflict tasks is 
unequivocal, many researchers are interested in the role of controlled behaviour on moderating 
performance in these tasks. One effect studied in this regard is the Gratton effect. The Gratton 
effect is the finding that congruency effects are larger following congruent relative to incongruent 
trials. This effect was first observed in the Eriksen flanker task by Gratton and colleagues (1992), 
but has also been observed in other tasks such as the Stroop task (e.g., Mayr & Awh, 2009; 
Notebaert, Gevers, Verbruggen, & Liefooghe, 2006). The standard account of the Gratton effect, 
termed the conflict adaptation account, is that participants detect conflict on incongruent trials 
and decrease attention to the word on the following trial in order to avoid further conflict. As a 
result, the Stroop effect will be smaller. In contrast, on congruent trials there is no conflict, so 
attention will not be as constrained on the following trial. Hence, the word can interfere more 
strongly and the Stroop effect will be larger. Due to these processes, a Gratton effect will emerge, 
that is, an interaction between congruency on the current trial and congruency on the previous 
trial (n – 1 congruency). As will be discussed in the following section, although by far the most 
popular account of the Gratton effect, the conflict adaptation account has not gone unchallenged. 
Stimulus Binding Biases 
 There are a whole series of confounds present in standard Stroop paradigms that can lead 
toward an interaction between congruency and n – 1 congruency in the absence of conflict 
adaptation. Essentially all of these confounds bias the interaction in the same direction, that is, in 
the direction of a Gratton effect. Several of them have already been studied. The first one is 
related to stimulus binding effects. Hommel (1998) observed that participants respond more 
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quickly to trials in which both the distracting and target stimulus dimensions alternate (e.g., 
BLUEred followed by GREENyellow; BLUEred → GREENyellow) or both repeat (e.g., BLUEred → 
BLUEred) relative to when one, but not both of the stimulus dimensions repeat (e.g., BLUEred → 
BLUEyellow or BLUEred → GREENred). The claimed reason for the impairment of performance on 
these partial repetition trials is that repetition of one stimulus dimension (e.g., the word) leads to 
retrieval of the previous binding (e.g., BLUEred), which conflicts with the processing of the 
current stimulus (e.g., BLUEyellow). 
 Mayr and colleagues (2003) pointed out that stimulus repetitions, alternations, and partial 
repetitions are not equally prevalent in the four crucial conditions used for assessing the Gratton 
effect. They found that after analysing alternation trials only (i.e., trials in which both the word 
and colour change), the Gratton effect disappeared. Subsequently, however, other work has 
demonstrated that Gratton effects, though weakened, can be observed even after word-word and 
colour-colour repetitions are removed (Freitas, Bahar, Yang, & Bahar, 2007; Kerns, Cohen, 
MacDonnald, Cho, Stenger, & Carter, 2004; Notebaert et al., 2006). Further work has also 
removed word-colour repetitions (i.e., negative priming trials; e.g., BLUEred → GREENblue) and 
colour-word repetitions (BLUEred → REDyellow), with results again showing a reduction but not 
elimination of the Gratton effect (Akçay & Hazeltine, 2007; Verbruggen, Notebaert, Liefooghe, 
& Vandierendonck, 2006). 
Sequential Contingency Biases 
 Contingency biases (Schmidt, in press) are a second confound that have been shown to 
artificially elevate the size of the Gratton effect. Experimenters often present distracting colour 
words more often in their congruent colour than would be expected by chance. For instance, in a 
four-choice task BLUE might be presented in blue 50% of the time, where chance would be 25%. 
This is problematic because Schmidt and colleagues (2007) have shown that participants learn 
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these contingencies and respond faster and more accurately to high contingency trials (i.e., where 
the word is presented in its most frequent colour) relative to low contingency trials (i.e., where 
the word is presented in an unexpected colour). If words are presented most often in their 
congruent colours, then congruency and contingency are perfectly confounded: congruent trials 
are high contingency and incongruent trials are low contingency. This is also true on the 
preceding (n – 1) trial: n – 1 congruent trials are high contingency and n – 1 incongruent trials are 
low contingency. Schmidt and colleagues have further shown that contingency and n – 1 
contingency (i.e., contingency on the previous trial) interact. Specifically, the contingency effect 
(low contingency – high contingency) is larger following high contingency trials than following 
low contingency trials. Thus, Gratton experiments with contingency confounds will be biased by 
a sequential contingency effect. 
 There are several possible reasons why a sequential contingency effect might occur. One 
account, superficially similar to the conflict adaptation account, is that participants increase 
attention to the word following a correct response prediction. The word correctly predicts the 
response on high contingency trails (e.g., for BLUEblue, where BLUE is presented most often in 
blue), thus leading to more attention to the word on the following trial, making for a larger 
contingency effect. In contrast, the word does not correctly predict the response on low 
contingency trials (e.g., for BLUEred), thus leading to less attention to the word on the following 
trial, making for a smaller contingency effect. Note that the attentional modulation component of 
this account is only superficially similar to the conflict adaptation account, as the system is 
proposed to shift attention based on response expectancy and not based on conflict (i.e., 
congruency). 
 Another, non-attentional explanation for the sequential contingency effect could be 
stimulus sequence biases. Participants respond faster to predictable sequences of trials (Nissen & 
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Bullemer, 1987) and participants will see a sequence of any two given high contingency trials 
more frequently than a series of any two given low contingency trials. For instance, because the 
high contingency trials BLUEblue and GREENgreen are presented quite frequently, participants will 
very often see the sequence BLUEblue → GREENgreen. In contrast, they will much less frequently 
see a sequence such as BLUEred → GREENgreen or GREENgreen → BLUEred, given that the 
stimulus MOVEred appears only infrequently. Indeed, such sequences violate the expectation of 
the stimuli likely to follow or precede a given high contingency trial (i.e., GREENgreen is not 
expected to go with BLUEred). Thus, (high contingency) congruent trials will be faster if preceded 
by a (high contingency) congruent trial rather than a (low contingency) incongruent trial. 
Similarly, a (low contingency) incongruent trial will be impaired if preceded by a (high 
contingency) congruent trial relative to a (low contingency) incongruent trial.
1
 
 Regardless of what the mechanism is driving the sequential contingency effect, it has 
been demonstrated by Schmidt and colleagues (2007). Thus, the smaller Stroop effect following 
(low contingency) incongruent trials relative to (high contingency) congruent trials may be in part 
a result of a sequential contingency effect rather than a sequential congruency effect. 
 Further support for the idea that contingency biases contribute to the Gratton effect comes 
from a study by Mayr and Awh (2009) who varied the proportion of congruent to incongruent 
trials from 70% to 30% in a six-choice task. Reducing the proportion of congruent trials reduces 
contingency biases and this manipulation reduced the Gratton effect. However, it did not explain 
the whole effect: a (reduced) Gratton effect was still present, even after deleting stimulus 
repetitions in the 30% condition. We do note, however, that 30% congruent items in a six-choice 
task is still well above chance (16.7%), thus not eliminating all contingency biases. Some studies 
do present congruent trials no more often than expected by chance, particularly in two-choice 
tasks (e.g., Davelaar & Stevens, 2009). However, these studies do not control for stimulus 
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bindings (and cannot do so with a two-choice task). Nieuwenhuis and colleagues (2006) were 
able to control for response repetitions, however, and this eliminated the Gratton effect in their 
contingency-unbiased two-choice experiments. Although they were unable to control for partial 
stimulus repetitions due to the two-choice nature of the tasks, their results are encouraging for the 
idea that the Gratton effect is due to sequential confounds rather than conflict adaptation. 
The Binding Account 
 We use the term binding account to refer to the idea that the Gratton effect is actually due 
to sequential confounds such as binding effects and contingencies. It has already been 
demonstrated that both stimulus bindings and contingencies can independently inflate the size of 
the Gratton effect. Thus, for instance, if one controls for stimulus repetitions, but uses a high 
proportion of congruent trials, then one cannot know whether the remaining effect is due to 
conflict adaptation or to contingency biases. In this paper, we report two experiments in which 
multiple sequential confounds were controlled for simultaneously. 
 An overview of the literature suggests that most Gratton experiments are confounded by 
either stimulus binding effects (e.g., Akçay & Hazeltine, 2007, 2008; Davelaar & Stevens, 2009; 
Egner, Delano, & Hirsch, 2007; Funes, Lupiáñez, & Humphreys, 2010b; Kerns et al., 2004; 
Notebaert et al., 2006; Ullsperger, Bylsma, & Botvinick, 2005, Experiment 1; Wendt, Kluwe, & 
Peters, 2006) or contingency biases (e.g., Akçay & Hazeltine, 2007; Mayr & Awh, 2009; 
Ullsperger et al., 2005, Experiment 2; Verbruggen et al., 2006). Contingency biases are less 
common in the (typically two-choice) flanker tasks, but stimulus binding effects are much more 
difficult to control for in these two-choice flanker tasks, for reasons we will discuss later. 
Stimulus binding trims are often completed in Stroop and Simon experiments but are often 
incomplete (e.g., Akçay & Hazeltine, 2007, 2008, controlled for stimulus and response 
repetitions in their Simon experiments, but not for stimulus location to response location 
SEQUENTIAL BIASES EXPLAIN THE GRATTON EFFECT 9 
repetitions, or vice versa). 
 Only one study that we are aware of has effectively controlled for binding effects and 
contingencies. In experiments reported by Freitas and colleagues (2007) participants performed 
two two-choice tasks (e.g., a colour-word Stroop and arrow flanker Stroop) that could randomly 
alternate from trial to trial. Thus, congruency could be manipulated from one trial to the next 
without repeating any stimuli. There were also no contingency biases. Freitas and colleagues did 
observe Gratton effects under these conditions. However, this finding is inconsistent with other 
similar reports showing that the Gratton effect is completely eliminated when the task (or type of 
interference; i.e., colour-word Stroop or arrow flanker Stroop) on the current trial is different 
from the task on the previous trial (e.g., Egner et al., 2007; Funes et al., 2010a, 2010b; Wendt et 
al., 2006). For instance, Wendt and colleagues found that flanker congruency on one trial did not 
modulate the Simon effect on the following trial and, similarly, that Simon congruency on one 
trial did not modulate the flanker congruency effect on the following trial. Furthermore, there are 
some caveats with the task switching approach of Frietas and colleagues. The critical conditions 
they used not only varied whether the previous trial was congruent or incongruent, but also 
included a task switch. It could be the case that a task switch is easier following a congruent trial 
relative to an incongruent trial, leading to quicker task reconfiguration and a larger Stroop effect 
after congruent relative to incongruent trials (i.e., a Gratton effect). This is not quite the same as 
the conflict adaptation idea that the conflict itself causes a reduction of attention to the word. A 
related caveat will be noted below when we introduce the concept of congruency task switches. 
 In our experiments, we adopted a different approach than that of Freitas and colleagues 
(2007). In order to completely control for both contingency and stimulus binding confounds, two 
conditions must be met. Condition 1 is that all stimulus words must be presented equally often in 
all colours. This approach eliminates any impact of contingency biases. Condition 2 is that all 
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responses on trials with word-word, colour-colour, word-colour, and colour-word repetitions 
must be removed from the analysis. In this way, stimulus binding effects can no longer produce a 
Gratton effect. In order to meet this condition, the task must be four-choice or greater. In two- 
and three-choice Stroop tasks it is impossible to delete all types of stimulus repetitions. For 
instance, in a three-choice task it is impossible to have an incongruent trial followed by an 
incongruent trial without repeating one of the stimulus dimensions. For instance, if BLUEred is 
presented on trial n – 1, then to make another incongruent trial on trial n one can use the third 
colour (e.g., green) as either the colour or the word, but blue or red must be used as the other 
stimulus dimension (because there are only three colours in a three-choice task). 
 In the first of our two experiments, each of four colour words was presented equally often 
in each of four colours, thus preventing unwanted contingency learning biases (Condition 1). 
Because the task is four-choice, it is possible to get observations for all four congruency by n – 1 
congruency conditions from trials without word-word, colour-colour, word-colour, or colour-
word stimulus repetitions (Condition 2). As illustrated in Table 1, the manipulation produces 15 
different trial types. The first goal of the experiment is to assess Gratton effects before and after 
removing repetition trials. For this, Trial Types 1, 3, 6, and 9 can be used to assess Gratton effects 
independent of any sequential confounds (see Table 1). 
(Table 1 about here) 
Congruency Switch Costs 
 In our experiments, we consider for the first time a third possible source of confounding 
that could also contribute to the appearance of a Gratton effect. This third source involves 
congruency switch costs and will be referred to as the switch hypothesis. The switch hypothesis 
posits that the processing and memory encoding of incongruent and congruent trials procedes 
somewhat differently. On incongruent trials (e.g., GREENblue), two response codes are generated, 
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one by the word (green key) and one by the colour (blue key). Thus, the cognitive system must 
distinguish between two potential responses and bind one potential response to the word and the 
other to the colour. In contrast, on congruent trials (e.g., BLUEblue) one response code is 
generated by both the word and the colour (blue key). Thus, the cognitive system does not need 
to distinguish between two potential responses and the single potential response is bound to both 
the colour and the word. In addition, the timing with which stimulus information is available to 
the cognitive system is different, due to the conflict occurring on incongruent, but not congruent 
trials. Our proposal is that the procedures that the cognitive system must engage in while 
processing stimuli and binding information into trial memories are slightly different on congruent 
and incongruent trials, thus requiring some reconfiguration on congruency switches (i.e., 
incongruent trials followed by congruent trials and congruent trials followed by incongruent 
trials) relative to trials where congruency stays the same (i.e., congruent trials followed by 
congruent trials and incongruent trials followed by incongruent trials). This recalibration, we 
propose, may sometimes come at a cost, analogous to the performance decrements observed 
when a task switch occurs (Jersild, 1927; see Monsell, 2003, for a review). Note that this is very 
different from detecting conflict and adapting attention (i.e., as per the conflict adaptation 
account). 
 Congruency switch costs could affect the results in several possible ways. Experiencing a 
congruency switch could slow processing (leading to a Gratton effect in response times) and/or it 
could increase errors (leading to a Gratton effect in error rates). Either way, the Stroop effect 
would be larger on trials following a congruent trial, because there would be a switch cost 
impairing incongruent trials, thus increasing the difference between congruent and incongruent 
trials. In contrast, the Stroop effect would be smaller on trials following incongruent trials, 
because there would be a switch cost impairing congruent trials, thus decreasing the difference 
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between congruent and incongruent trials.
2
 Thus, congruency switch costs will produce a Gratton 
effect. 
 Our primary research goal, however, is to assess the validity of the conflict adaptation 
account of Gratton effects. Therefore, rather than trying to demonstrate the existence of 
congruency switch effects, our main aim is to determine whether any Gratton effects that remain 
after trimming stimulus repetitions are due to congruency switch costs or to true conflict 
adaptation. The conflict adaptation account claims that the change in the size of the contingency 
effect is due to changes in attention to the word. Given that the Stroop effect is almost 
exclusively an interference phenomenon (e.g., see MacLeod, 1991, for a review), one should 
therefore expect that all (or at least most) of the change in the size of the Stroop effect should 
occur in the incongruent condition. Congruent trials should be largely unaffected due to the fact 
that fact facilitation for congruent trials is, at best, very minimal. 
 In contrast, the switch hypothesis proposes performance costs for incongruent trials 
preceded by congruent trials and (more importantly) congruent trials preceded by incongruent 
trials. Thus, congruent trials should be affected according to the switch hypothesis. Furthermore, 
analysing congruency as a function of switch rather than n – 1 congruency should lead to roughly 
additive effects of congruency and switch (for a similar argument in the proportion congruency 
literature regarding contingency and congruency, see Schmidt & Besner, 2008). Specifically, 
congruent trials preceded by an incongruent trial (switch) should be impaired relative to 
congruent trials preceded by a congruent trial (repetition) and incongruent trials preceded by a 
congruent trial (switch) should be impaired relative to incongruent trials preceded by an 
incongruent trial (repetition). That is, there should be slower reaction times and/or a larger 
number of errors for both congruent and incongruent trials in the switch condition, thus not 
changing the difference between these two conditions and making this difference roughly the 
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same size as in the repetition condition. A visual inspection of the results of Freitas and 
colleagues (2007), where a Gratton effect was observed after controlling for contingency and 
binding biases, seems consistent with this pattern. Note that such a pattern is not consistent with 
the conflict adaptation account, because congruent trials should not be affected as much as 
incongruent trials by a change in attention to words. 
 Additionally, if a Gratton effect is observed in errors after the stimulus repetition trims, 
then an analysis of the type of errors participants make can help us distinguish between conflict 
adaptation and congruency switch costs. According to the conflict adaptation account more 
attention is given to the word following a congruent relative to an incongruent trial. This should 
mean that participants are more prone to produce word reading errors, where the participant 
produces the response associated with the word rather than the response associated with the 
colour (e.g., pressing the green key to the stimulus GREENblue).
3
 The second type of errors are 
random errors, that is, where participants press a key at random (often a response other than the 
correct response or the response associated with the word). Such errors suggest that the 
participant is simply not attending to the task or is stuck coming up with a response and randomly 
presses one of the available response buttons. Increased attention to the word should only 
produce more word reading errors and not more random errors. In contrast, the switch hypothesis 
does not predict an increase in word reading errors after congruent relative to incongruent trials, 
but rather predicts an increase in random errors on switch trials when the system is stuck because 
of a congruency switch. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
 Participants. Twenty-three Ghent University undergraduates participated in exchange for 
course credit. 
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 Apparatus. Participants made their responses with an AZERTY keyboard by pressing the 
“D” key for blue, the “F” key for green, the “J” key for yellow, and the “K” key for red. Stimulus 
and response timing were controlled by E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools, 2002). 
 Design. Stimuli were presented on a black screen and consisted of four distracting Dutch 
colour words (BLAUW [blue], GROEN [green], GEEL [yellow], and ROOD [red]) printed in the 
same four colours (blue, green, yellow, and red), for a total of 16 unique stimuli. Each word was 
presented equally often in each colour. Each participant saw 1000 stimuli, which were selected at 
random with replacement (this was to avoid end-of-block learning effects; see Boyer, 
Destrebecqz, & Cleeremans, 2005; Lee, 1997). Words were presented in lowercase, bold, 18 pt 
Bookman Old Style font. The RGB values for the colours were 60,170,255 (blue), 0,255,0 
(green), 255,255,0 (yellow), and 255,0,0 (red). 
 Procedure. Participants sat approximately 60 cm from the screen. On each trial, they 
were presented with a white “+” as a fixation for 100 ms, followed by a blank screen for 100 ms, 
followed by the stimulus for 1500 ms or until a response was made. This was followed by 400 ms 
of blank screen for correct responses or 400 ms of “XXX” in red for incorrect responses and trials 
where participants failed to respond. 
Results 
 Mean correct response latencies and error percentages were collected for each participant. 
The means for each of the 15 unique repetition trial types are presented in Table 1. Gratton 
effects were first analysed without removing stimulus repetitions and then with colour-colour, 
word-word, word-colour, and colour-word repetitions removed (Types 1, 3, 6, and 9 in Table 1). 
The data of non-repetition trials were also analysed for block effects. Finally, the error data were 
analysed for switch effects. Trials in which participants failed to respond were excluded from all 
analyses. 
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 Response latencies with repetitions included. We first examined the response latencies 
with repetition trials included in the analysis. These data are presented in the left panel of Figure 
1. An ANOVA with the factors of congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and n – 1 congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent) revealed a significant main effect of congruency, F(1,22) = 93.863, 
MSE = 848, p < .001, 2p  = .81, indicating an overall Stroop effect. The main effect for n – 1 
congruency was not significant, F(1,22) = .457, MSE = 347, p = .506, 2p  = .02. Critically, the 
congruency by n – 1 congruency interaction was significant, F(1,22) = 6.415, MSE = 510, p = 
.019, 2p  = .23, indicating a larger Stroop effect for trials following a congruent trial (i.e., a 
Gratton effect). The congruency effect was significant for trials following a congruent trial 
(congruent: 648 ms; incongruent: 718 ms), t(22) = 7.372, SEdiff = 9.6, p < .001, 
2
p  = .71, and for 
trials following an incongruent trial (congruent: 662 ms; incongruent: 709 ms), t(22) = 9.202, 
SEdiff = 5.1, p < .001, 
2
p  = .79. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 Response latencies with repetitions excluded. The next analysis took into account only 
the response latencies on alternation trials (i.e., where no stimulus dimensions repeated). These 
data are presented in the right panel of Figure 1. An ANOVA with the factors of congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent) and n – 1 congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) revealed a 
significant main effect of congruency, F(1,22) = 78.437, MSE = 2065, p < .001, 2p  = .78, 
indicating an overall Stroop effect. The main effect for n – 1 congruency was not significant, 
F(1,22) = .026, MSE = 737, p = .874, 2p  < .01. Critically, the congruency by n – 1 congruency 
interaction was not significant, F(1,22) = .009, MSE = 663, p = .926, 2p  < .0005, indicating that 
the Stroop effect was the same size for trials following congruent and incongruent trials (i.e., no 
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Gratton effect). The effect size ( 2p ) of this interaction was quite small and the test had medium 
power (.56) to detect an interaction of the size that was observed in the full set of trials. Further, 
when these trimmed response latencies were compared with the repetition trials that were deleted 
by adding repetition as a factor (non-repetition vs. repetition), a significant three-way interaction 
between congruency, n – 1 congruency, and repetition emerged, F(1,22) = 39.576, MSE = 564, p 
= .001, 2p  = .64, demonstrating a significant reduction in the size of the Gratton effect by 
removing repetitions. Thus, discarding repetition trials appeared to have eliminated the Gratton 
effect. As no effect remained, a switch analysis on response times was not conducted. The 
congruency effect was significant for trials following a congruent trial (congruent: 702 ms; 
incongruent: 787 ms), t(22) = 7.856, SEdiff = 10.7, p < .001, 
2
p  = .74, and for trials following an 
incongruent trial (congruent: 702 ms; incongruent: 785 ms), t(22) = 7.559, SEdiff = 10.0, p < .001, 
2
p  = .72. 
 Blocked response latencies. As results from Mayr and Awh (2009) suggest that conflict 
adaptation effects might be more likely early in the task, the data with repetitions excluded was 
then split into four blocks of 250 trials each. These data are presented in Table 2. Splitting the 
data into smaller blocks, in combination with the deletion of stimulus repetitions, greatly reduces 
the number of observations per cell (making the data noisier). Indeed, one participant had to be 
deleted due to not having an observation in every cell. An ANOVA with factors of block (1-4), 
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), and n – 1 congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) did 
not reveal a critical three-way interaction, F(3,63) = .472, MSE = 1483, p = .703, 2p  = .02, 
indicating no significant differences between the size of the (null) Gratton effect across blocks. 
Furthermore, an ANOVA for the first block alone with factors of congruency (congruent vs. 
incongruent) and n – 1 congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) did not reveal a significant 
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interaction, F(1,21) = .518, MSE = 2411, p = .480, 2p  = .02. Indeed, the difference was in the 
incorrect direction for a Gratton effect. 
(Table 2 about here) 
 Errors with repetitions included. The percentage errors with repetitions included are 
presented in the left panel of Figure 2. An ANOVA with the factors of congruency (congruent vs. 
incongruent) and n – 1 congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) revealed a significant main effect 
of congruency, F(1,22) = 17.894, MSE = 35, p < .001, 2p  = .45, indicating an overall Stroop 
effect. The main effect for n – 1 congruency was not significant, F(1,22) = .841, MSE = 7, p = 
.369, 2p  = .04. Critically, the congruency by n – 1 congruency interaction was significant, 
F(1,22) = 15.480, MSE = 9, p < .001, 2p  = .41, indicating a larger Stroop effect for trials 
following a congruent trial (i.e., a Gratton effect). The congruency effect was significant for trials 
following a congruent trial (congruent: 7.6%; incongruent: 14.9%), t(22) = 4.496, SEdiff = 1.7, p < 
.001, 2p  = .48, and for trials following an incongruent trial (congruent: 8.2%; incongruent: 
12.0%), t(22) = 2.925, SEdiff = 1.0, p = .008, 
2
p  = .28. 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 Errors with repetitions excluded. The percentage errors for alternation trials (i.e., with 
all stimulus repetitions excluded) are presented in the right panel of Figure 2. An ANOVA with 
the factors of congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and n – 1 congruency (congruent vs. 
incongruent) revealed a significant main effect of congruency, F(1,22) = 18.225, MSE = 48, p < 
.001, 2p  = .45, indicating an overall Stroop effect. The main effect for n – 1 congruency was not 
significant, F(1,22) = .106, MSE = 15, p = .748, 2p  < .01. Inconsistent with the response time 
data, the congruency by n – 1 congruency interaction was significant, F(1,22) = 8.181, MSE = 13, 
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p = .009, 2p  = .27, indicating a larger Stroop effect for trials following a congruent trial (i.e., a 
Gratton effect). Thus, while removing stimulus repetitions eliminated the Gratton effect in the 
response times, it did not eliminate the Gratton effect in the errors (though the switch analysis 
will provide an explanation for this remaining effect). The congruency effect was significant for 
trials following a congruent trial (congruent: 8.3%; incongruent: 16.7%), t(22) = 4.537, SEdiff = 
1.8, p < .001, 2p  = .48, and for trials following an incongruent trial (congruent: 10.2%; 
incongruent: 14.2%), t(22) = 2.863, SEdiff = 1.4, p = .009, 
2
p  = .27. 
 Blocked errors. Like the response latencies, the error data with repetitions excluded was 
then split into four blocks of 250 trials each. This data is presented in Table 3. The same 
participant had to be deleted due to not having an observation in every cell. An ANOVA with 
factors of block (1-4), congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), and n – 1 congruency (congruent 
vs. incongruent) did not reveal a critical three-way interaction, F(3,63) = .793, MSE = 49, p = 
.502, 2p  = .04, indicating no significant differences between the size of the Gratton effect across 
blocks. 
(Table 3 about here) 
 Word reading errors. For each participant, word reading errors for incongruent trials 
were calculated as the percent of errors for the incongruent response that exceeds the percent of 
errors to other incorrect responses. Word reading errors accounted for a large portion of the 
congruency effect. Participants made 4.0% word reading errors to incongruent trials following a 
congruent trial and 3.4% word reading errors to incongruent trials following an incongruent trial. 
This 0.6% difference was not significant, t(22) = .625, SEdiff = 1.0, p =.538, 
2
p  = .02, consistent 
with the switch hypothesis. This test had high power (.80) to detect an effect as small as 2.9% and 
very high power (>.99) to detect an effect as small as the Gratton effect observed in the error data 
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with repetitions included. 
 Random errors. Random errors are what remain after removing word reading errors. The 
data for random errors are presented in Figure 3. An ANOVA with the factors of switch type 
(repetition vs. switch) and congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) revealed a significant effect of 
switch type, F(1,22) = 4.495, MSE = 18, p = .046, 2p  = .17, indicating more errors overall for 
switch trials. The main effect of congruency was marginal, F(1,22) = 3.847, MSE = 37, p = .063, 
2
p  = .15, demonstrating a small impact of random errors on the congruency effect (i.e., in 
addition word reading errors). Critically, the interaction between switch type and congruency was 
not significant, F(1,22) = .002, MSE = 19, p = .962, 2p  < .0001, again consistent with the switch 
hypothesis. The effect size ( 2p ) was very small and power was high (.80) to detect an interaction 
as small as 5.3%. 
(Figure 3 about here) 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 replicated the basic Gratton effect in response times and error rates. 
However, by using stimuli that were not contingency biased and removing trials containing 
stimulus repetitions the Gratton effect was eliminated in the response times, even in the first 
block (cf., Mayr & Awh, 2009). These results support the binding account by showing that the 
Gratton effect is fully explained by stimulus binding and contingency confounds. Indeed, the 
means for congruent and incongruent trials in the two n – 1 congruency conditions are essentially 
identical. No evidence for conflict adaptation was found in the response latencies. 
 A relatively large Gratton effect did remain in the error data after removing stimulus 
repetitions. Without further analysis, this effect would be consistent with the conflict adaptation 
account. However, further analyses demonstrated that this remaining effect was due to 
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congruency switch costs and not conflict adaptation. Specifically, word reading errors were not 
more likely following a congruent than an incongruent trial, in contrast to the prediction of 
increased errors by the conflict adaptation account. Instead, the error Gratton effect was due to a 
greater number of random key press errors following a congruency switch (i.e., a congruent trial 
followed by an incongruent trial or an incongruent trial followed by a congruent trial). The 
conflict adaptation account was therefore unable to explain any of the data in Experiment 1. 
These results instead provide tentative support for the idea that congruency switch costs can 
contribute to the Gratton effect. No switch costs were found for response times. 
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 was conceptually identical to Experiment 1, but was a flanker task rather 
than a colour-word Stroop task. In the Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), a centrally-located 
target letter is presented with distracting letters flanking it to the left and right (e.g., FFJFF, where 
“J” is the target and the “F”s are distracters). The flankers match the target on congruent trials 
(e.g., JJJJJ) and mismatch on incongruent trials (e.g., FFJFF). Similar to a colour-word Stroop 
task, participants respond to the identity of the target with a key press. This experiment served as 
a replication of Experiment 1. 
Method 
Participants 
 Twenty-four Ghent University undergraduates participated in exchange for course credit. 
Apparatus 
 The apparatus for Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1, except participants 
pressed the “D” key for D, the “F” key for F, the “J” key for J, and the “K” key for K. 
Design and Procedure 
 The design and procedure of Experiment 2 were identical to those of Experiment 1 with a 
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few exceptions. Stimuli were strings of five capital letters presented in white, which consisted of 
one centrally-located target letter (D, F, J, or K) and a distracting letter (D, F, J, or K) presented 
twice to the left and the right of the target (e.g., KKFKK), for a total of 16 unique stimuli. Each 
target letter was presented equally often with each distracter letter. 
Results 
 Mean correct response latencies and error percentages were collected for each participant. 
The means for each of the 15 unique repetition trial types are presented in Table 4. Gratton 
effects were first assessed without removing trials with repetitions and second with target-target, 
flanker-flanker, flanker-target, and target-flanker repetitions removed (Types 1, 3, 6, and 9 in 
Table 4). The data of non-repetition trials were also analysed for block effects. Trials in which 
participants failed to respond were excluded from all analyses. 
(Table 4 about here) 
 Response latencies with repetitions included. We first examined the response latencies 
with repetition trials included in the analysis. These data are presented in the left panel of Figure 
4. An ANOVA with the factors of congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and n – 1 congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent) revealed a significant main effect of congruency, F(1,23) = 130.940, 
MSE = 266, p < .001, 2p  = .85, indicating an overall Stroop effect. The main effect for n – 1 
congruency was significant, F(1,23) = 4.522, MSE = 292, p = .044, 2p  = .16. Critically, the 
congruency by n – 1 congruency interaction was significant, F(1,23) = 7.624, MSE = 222, p = 
.011, 2p  = .25, indicating a larger Stroop effect for trials following a congruent trial (i.e., a 
Gratton effect). The congruency effect was significant for trials following a congruent trial 
(congruent: 590 ms; incongruent: 636 ms), t(23) = 8.017, SEdiff = 5.8, p < .001, 
2
p  = .74, and for 
trials following an incongruent trial (congruent: 606 ms; incongruent: 635 ms), t(22) = 11.178, 
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SEdiff = 2.7, p < .001, 
2
p  = .84. 
(Figure 4 about here) 
 Response latencies with repetitions excluded. The next analysis took into account only 
the response latencies on alternation trials (i.e., where no stimulus dimensions repeated). These 
data are presented in the right panel of Figure 4. An ANOVA with the factors of congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent) and n – 1 congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) revealed a 
significant main effect of congruency, F(1,23) = 82.776, MSE = 320, p < .001, 2p  = .78, 
indicating an overall Stroop effect. The main effect for n – 1 congruency was not significant, 
F(1,23) = .260, MSE = 640, p = .615, 2p  = .01. Critically, the congruency by n – 1 congruency 
interaction was not significant, F(1,23) = .890, MSE = 663, p = .375, 2p  = .04, indicating that the 
Stroop effect was the same size for trials following congruent and incongruent trials (i.e., no 
Gratton effect). The effect size ( 2p ) of this interaction was small and the test had medium power 
(.53) to detect an interaction of the size that was observed in the full set of trials. Further, when 
these trimmed response latencies were compared with the repetition trials that were deleted by 
adding repetition as a factor (non-repetition vs. repetition), a significant three-way interaction 
between congruency, n – 1 congruency, and repetition emerged, F(1,23) = 25.210, MSE = 491, p 
= .001, 2p  = .52, demonstrating a significant reduction in the size of the Gratton effect by 
removing repetitions. Thus, discarding repetition trials again eliminated the Gratton effect. The 
congruency effect was significant for trials following a congruent trial (congruent: 623 ms; 
incongruent: 660 ms), t(23) = 5.643, SEdiff = 6.5, p < .001, 
2
p  = .58, and for trials following an 
incongruent trial (congruent: 624 ms; incongruent: 653 ms), t(23) = 7.595, SEdiff = 3.9, p < .001, 
2
p  = .71. 
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 Blocked response latencies. As with Experiment 1, the data with repetitions excluded 
was then split into four blocks of 250 trials each. These data are presented in Table 5. An 
ANOVA with factors of block (1-4), congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), and n – 1 
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) did not reveal a critical three-way interaction, F(3,69) = 
.096, MSE = 1096, p = .962, 2p  < .01, indicating no significant differences between the size of 
the (null) Gratton effect across blocks. Furthermore, an ANOVA for the first block alone with 
factors of congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and n – 1 congruency (congruent vs. 
incongruent) did not reveal a significant interaction, F(1,23) = .184, MSE = 1551, p = .672, 2p  < 
.01. Indeed, the interaction was numerically in the incorrect direction for a Gratton effect. 
(Table 5 about here) 
 Errors with repetitions included. The error effects (along with the overall error rate) in 
Experiment 2 were generally much smaller than those observed in Experiment 1. The percentage 
errors with repetitions included are presented in the left panel of Figure 5. An ANOVA with the 
factors of congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and n – 1 congruency (congruent vs. 
incongruent) revealed a significant main effect of congruency, F(1,23) = 6.979, MSE = 10, p = 
.015, 2p  = .23, indicating an overall Stroop effect. The main effect for n – 1 congruency was not 
significant, F(1,23) = .760, MSE = 3, p = .392, 2p  = .03. In contrast to the results of Experiment 
1, the congruency by n – 1 congruency interaction was not significant in the untrimmed data, 
F(1,23) = .014, MSE = 7, p = .906, 2p  < .001, indicating no difference in the size of the Stroop 
effect for trials following a congruent trial (i.e., no Gratton effect). The congruency effect was not 
significant for trials following a congruent trial (congruent: 6.5%; incongruent: 8.3%), t(23) = 
1.688, SEdiff = 1.1, p = .105, 
2
p  = .11, and was significant for trials following an incongruent trial 
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(congruent: 6.3%; incongruent: 8.0%), t(23) = 3.162, SEdiff = .5, p = .004, 
2
p  = .30. 
(Figure 5 about here) 
 Errors with repetitions excluded. The percentage errors for alternation trials (i.e., with 
all stimulus repetitions excluded) are presented in the right panel of Figure 5. An ANOVA with 
the factors of congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and n – 1 congruency (congruent vs. 
incongruent) was conducted. The main effect of congruency was not significant, F(1,23) = 1.417, 
MSE = 19, p = .246, 2p  = .06, nor was the main effect for n – 1 congruency, F(1,23) = 2.650, 
MSE = 9, p = .117, 2p  = .10. Critically, the congruency by n – 1 congruency interaction was not 
significant, F(1,23) = .089, MSE = 14, p = .768, 2p  < .004, indicating no difference in the size of 
the Stroop effect for trials following a congruent trial (i.e., no Gratton effect). The effect size for 
this comparison ( 2p ) was quite small and the test had high power (.80) to detect an effect as 
small as 4.5%. Indeed, the numerical difference was in the incorrect direction for a Gratton effect. 
The congruency effect was not significant for trials following a congruent trial (congruent: 8.8%; 
incongruent: 9.6%), t(23) = .546, SEdiff = 1.5, p = .590, 
2
p  = .01, but was marginal for trials 
following an incongruent trial (congruent: 7.5%; incongruent: 8.9%), t(23) = 1.939, SEdiff = .7, p 
= .065, 2p  = .14. 
 Blocked errors. Like the response latencies, the error data with repetitions excluded was 
then split into four blocks of 250 trials each. This data is presented in Table 6. An ANOVA with 
factors of block (1-4), congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), and n – 1 congruency (congruent 
vs. incongruent) did not reveal a critical three-way interaction, F(3,69) = 2.020, MSE = 44, p = 
.119, 2p  = .08, indicating no significant differences between the size of the (null) Gratton effect 
across blocks. Furthermore, an ANOVA for the first block alone with factors of congruency 
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(congruent vs. incongruent) and n – 1 congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) did not reveal a 
significant interaction, F(1,23) = .043, MSE = 35, p = .838, 2p  < .002. Again, the effect was 
numerically in the incorrect direction for a Gratton effect. 
(Table 6 about here) 
Discussion 
 Similar to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 replicated the basic Gratton effect in response 
times. However, by using stimuli that were not contingency biased and removing trials containing 
stimulus repetitions the Gratton effect was again eliminated, even in the first block. These results 
again support the binding account by showing that the Gratton effect is fully explained by 
stimulus binding and contingency confounds and again produced no evidence for conflict 
adaptation. In contrast to Experiment 1, no Gratton effect in errors was observed in Experiment 2, 
even in the untrimmed data. Thus, there was no point in conducting switch analyses on these 
data. These data were therefore also unable to provide us another test of the switch hypothesis. 
Most critically, however, Experiment 2 again failed to find any support for the conflict adaptation 
account of Gratton effects. 
General Discussion 
 The results of two experiments provide strong support for an interpretation of the Gratton 
effect that does not rely on conflict adaptation processes. The response time data of both the 
colour-word Stroop (Experiment 1) and Eriksen flanker (Experiment 2) experiments 
demonstrated that if the task is not biased by contingencies and if stimulus repetitions are 
removed, then the Gratton effect is eliminated. Although the Gratton effect did remain in the 
errors of Experiment 1 (but not Experiment 2) after deleting stimulus repetitions, the switch 
analysis of these error data supported the predictions of the switch hypothesis and disconfirmed 
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the conflict adaptation account. Specifically, the remaining Gratton effect in the errors was due to 
increased random key press errors following a congruency switch and not by an increase in word 
reading errors following congruent trials. Thus, none of the results reported in the current work 
were consistent with the conflict adaptation account of Gratton effects. 
 Indeed, without the switch analysis, the conflicting results for response latencies and 
errors would seem unusual from the perspective of both the binding account and the conflict 
adaptation account. Ignoring congruency switch costs as a potential confound, clearly the binding 
account would have had to predict a null Gratton effect in the errors. However, the conflicting 
results would not have fitted well with the conflict adaptation account, either. It is not clear how 
the attentional mechanism proposed by the conflict adaptation account could produce an effect in 
errors and not response times. If participants are decreasing attention to the word (or increasing 
attention to the colour) following incongruent trials, then this should certainly lead to a Gratton 
effect on response times in addition to errors (especially given that the response time Stroop 
effect is substantially more reliable than the corresponding error effect). Furthermore, decreasing 
attention to the word following an incongruent (conflict) trial should increase the number of word 
reading errors on the following trial. This was not observed. Instead, the error Gratton effect was 
due to greater random key press errors when congruency switched, as predicted by the switch 
hypothesis. 
 If the switch analysis were ignored, one may want to argue that observing an effect in 
errors but not response times is not a problem for the conflict adaptation account. Indeed, 
although response time effects are generally much more reliable than error effects, it is certainly 
possible to maximize effects in errors while decreasing effects in response times, for instance, by 
using a response deadline procedure (e.g., Jacoby, Lindsay, & Hessels, 2003; Lindsay & Jacoby, 
1994). However, there was a reliable and sufficiently large (84 ms) main effect of congruency in 
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the response time data of Experiment 1 with repetitions excluded, demonstrating clearly that 
response time effects were present, but they were simply not modulated by n – 1 congruency. 
Thus, there was no trade-off between response time and error effects. 
 Alternatively, one could defend the conflict adaptation account by suggesting that there 
was a ceiling effect for incongruent trials in the response latency data, thus preventing an 
increased interference effect following congruent trials in response times. However, this seems 
both unusual and unlikely given that these trials were not responded to unusually slowly (indeed, 
faster than some similar reports; e.g., Mayr & Awh, 2009). Further, the switch analysis was 
inconsistent with the conflict adaptation prediction that the error Gratton effect should be driven 
by increased word reading errors. From our perspective, the account that best fits the data is a 
hybrid of the binding account and the switch hypothesis. It must be noted, however, that support 
for our a priori switch hypothesis is currently limited only to the error data of one of our 
experiments. More work is of course necessary. Nevertheless, the data support the conclusion 
that the Gratton effect is merely the by-product of contingency, stimulus binding, and (possibly) 
congruency switch costs. This contrasts sharply with the conventional view, which touts the 
Gratton effect as a demonstration of cognitive control. 
Conflict Monitoring 
 The results of this work bear strongly on the conflict monitoring literature. Botvinick and 
colleagues (2001) presented a computational model that both detects conflict (e.g., on an 
incongruent trial) and subsequently adapts to this conflict by adjusting attention. The two key 
pieces of evidence produced for supporting the conflict monitoring model of Botvinick and 
colleagues are the proportion congruent effect and the Gratton effect. However, Schmidt and 
Besner (2008; see also, Schmidt, 2010; Schmidt et al., 2007) have called into question whether 
proportion congruent effects have anything to do with conflict adaptation. Schmidt and Besner 
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demonstrated that confounding contingencies present in the task completely explain the effect. 
Schmidt (2010) further developed a computation model that learns contingencies instead of 
adapting to conflict and can simulate proportion congruent effects (for conflict adaptation 
competitors, see Blais, Robidoux, Risko, & Besner, 2007; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008). Although 
this is still a very heated area of debate, this work suggests that the proportion congruent effect is 
driven by learned word-response relationships and not conflict adaptation. While the lead author 
has argued (often parenthetically) in these papers that Gratton effects, in contrast to proportion 
congruent effects, are probably due to conflict adaptation, the results of the present paper suggest 
otherwise. That is, the Gratton effect, too, is fully explained by confounds present in the task, and 
not by conflict adaptation. If this assertion is true, then this fact has serious implications for the 
conflict monitoring idea in general. 
 One purported strength of the conflict monitoring account is that it has been used to 
account for both behavioural and brain data (e.g., see the original conflict monitoring paper by 
Botvinick et al., 2001). In particular, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) have been implicated in conflict monitoring and adaptation. It is 
important to highlight, however, that none of the key neuroimaging papers demonstrating a 
relationship between ACC and/or DLPFC activation and a behavioural effect properly control for 
all confounds. In particular, every one of these papers either introduces contingency confounds 
(e.g., Kerns et al., 2004) or fails to control for some or all stimulus binding effects (e.g., Blais & 
Bunge, 2010). 
 ACC and DLPFC activation have been described as evidence for conflict adaptation. 
However, it is equally conceivable that the ACC and DLPFC are responsible for memory 
consolidation or retrieval processes. Indeed, these areas have been implicated in this respect long 
before the conflict monitoring model was first proposed (e.g., see a review by Cabeza & Nyberg, 
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1997). Further, our episodic memory account (Schmidt, 2010) assumes that short-term binding 
effects and long-term contingency learning effects are the result of the same memory storage and 
retrieval processes, so it stands to reason that both types of biases should be associated with 
activation in the same (or similar) regions (see, Nairne, 1996; Öztekin, McElree, Staresina, & 
Davachi, 2008, for more on the single-store perspective on memory). The episodic account is also 
elegant and parsimonious in that various cognitive results (e.g., the proportion congruent effect 
and Gratton effect) are simply an incidental byproduct of memory storage and retrieval processes. 
It is not unequivocally clear that one needs to make further assumptions about rapid cognitive 
control mechanisms such as the conflict monitoring and conflict adaptation processes suggested 
by authors such as Botvinick and colleagues (2001). 
 If, however, in contrast to the current results, a Gratton effect can be demonstrated after 
all of the confounds highlighted in this paper have been controlled, then it is still necessary for 
these controls to be conducted in all future work with the Gratton effect. By failing to control for 
these confounds, one can never know whether a given result (e.g., the correlation between the 
behavioural effect and ACC/DLPFC activity) is due to conflict adaptation or to one or more of 
these confounds. 
Conclusions 
 The results of the analyses presented in this paper suggest that the Gratton effect, contrary 
to popular belief, is not due to conflict adaptation. Instead, sequential task biases such as 
contingencies, stimulus bindings, and (possibly) congruency switch costs account for the critical 
interaction between congruency and n – 1 congruency. The Gratton effect does not therefore 
seem to be an index of cognitive control. At a minimum, cognitive control processes certainly do 
not seem to account for very much variance in this paradigm. This work, along with related work 
from our lab (e.g., Schmidt, 2010; Schmidt & Besner, 2008), has potentially devastating 
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consequences for theory on conflict monitoring and conflict adaptation. Further research in this 
domain is certainly warranted. 
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Footnotes 
1
 All (low contingency) incongruent items are presented infrequently, so a series of two of them 
does not violate any sequential trial biases. 
2
 Note that an argument similar to this could be forwarded for the sequential contingency effect, 
as well. That is, the sequential contingency effect might be partially (or wholly) due to 
contingency switch costs. 
3
 Note, of course, that in a key press task a word reading error is not, strictly speaking, a word 
“reading” error, but the idea is the same: participants output the response associated with the 
distracting word rather than the response associated with the target colour. 
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Table 1. Experiment 1 trial type examples with response times and errors 
 Repetition Type* Response 
Time 
Error 
Rate Trial Type W-W C-C W-C C-W 
Congruent – Congruent       
(1) BLUEblue → REDred     702 ms 8.3% 
(2) BLUEblue → BLUEblue x x x x 494 ms 3.8% 
Congruent – Incongruent       
(3) BLUEblue → REDgreen     787 ms 16.7% 
(4) BLUEblue → BLUEred x   x 749 ms 16.0% 
(5) BLUEblue → REDblue  x x  570 ms 10.7% 
Incongruent – Congruent       
(6) REDblue → GREENgreen     702 ms 10.2% 
(7) REDblue → REDred x  x  696 ms 11.9% 
(8) REDblue → BLUEblue  x  x 559 ms 4.4% 
Incongruent – Incongruent       
(9) REDblue → GREENyellow     785 ms 14.2% 
(10) REDblue → REDgreen x    754 ms 13.5% 
(11) REDblue → GREENblue  x   571 ms 8.6% 
(12) REDblue → REDblue x x   520 ms 5.2% 
(13) REDblue → GREENred   x  773 ms 14.5% 
(14) REDblue → BLUEgreen    x 755 ms 12.1% 
(15) REDblue → BLUEred   x x 759 ms 12.7% 
*W-W = word-word; C-C = colour-colour; W-C = word-colour; C-W = colour-word 
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Table 2. Experiment 1 response times by trial type and block 
 Block 
Trial Type 1-250 251-500 501-725 726-1000 
Congruent-Congruent 732 ms 677 ms 687 ms 700 ms 
Congruent-Incongruent 789 ms 783 ms 771 ms 759 ms 
Incongruent-Congruent 703 ms 693 ms 695 ms 685 ms 
Incongruent-Incongruent 776 ms 778 ms 785 ms 755 ms 
Gratton Effect -15 ms 21 ms -5 ms -11 ms 
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Table 3. Experiment 1 errors by trial type and block 
 Block 
Trial Type 1-250 251-500 501-725 726-1000 
Congruent-Congruent 8.7% 8.0% 5.9% 9.6% 
Congruent-Incongruent 18.1% 17.0% 15.6% 15.3% 
Incongruent-Congruent 9.0% 8.9% 9.6% 13.3% 
Incongruent-Incongruent 16.0% 11.6% 11.0% 15.5% 
Gratton Effect 2.4% 6.2% 8.3% 3.5% 
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Table 4. Experiment 2 trial type examples with response times and errors 
 Repetition Type* Response 
Time 
Error 
Rate Trial Type F-F T-T F-T T-F 
Congruent – Congruent       
(1) DDDDD → FFFFF     623 ms 8.8% 
(2) DDDDD → DDDDD x x x x 498 ms .3% 
Congruent – Incongruent       
(3) DDDDD → FFJFF     660 ms 9.6% 
(4) DDDDD → DDFDD x   x 661 ms 10.9% 
(5) DDDDD → FFDFF  x x  572 ms 3.1% 
Incongruent – Congruent       
(6) FFDFF → JJJJJ     624 ms 7.6% 
(7) FFDFF → FFFFF x  x  623 ms 7.8% 
(8) FFDFF → DDDDD  x  x 550 ms 1.8% 
Incongruent – Incongruent       
(9) FFDFF → JJKJJ     653 ms 8.9% 
(10) FFDFF → FFJFF x    661 ms 9.5% 
(11) FFDFF → JJDJJ  x   575 ms 3.2% 
(12) FFDFF → FFDFF x x   545 ms 3.6% 
(13) FFDFF → JJFJJ   x  662 ms 10.3% 
(14) FFDFF → DDJDD    x 665 ms 9.3% 
(15) FFDFF → DDFDD   x x 665 ms 10.4% 
*F-F = flanker-flanker; T-T = target-target; F-T = flanker-target; T-F = target-flanker 
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Table 5. Experiment 2 response times by trial type and block 
 Block 
Trial Type 1-250 251-500 501-725 726-1000 
Congruent-Congruent 631 ms 636 ms 619 ms 595 ms 
Congruent-Incongruent 671 ms 671 ms 662 ms 632 ms 
Incongruent-Congruent 644 ms 634 ms 617 ms 601 ms 
Incongruent-Incongruent 677 ms 655 ms 653 ms 634 ms 
Gratton Effect -7 ms 14 ms 7 ms 4 ms 
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Table 6. Experiment 2 errors by trial type and block 
 Block 
Trial Type 1-250 251-500 501-725 726-1000 
Congruent-Congruent 6.4% 4.2% 13.5% 10.8% 
Congruent-Incongruent 7.4% 9.1% 10.5% 11.6% 
Incongruent-Congruent 6.9% 7.0% 10.6% 5.7% 
Incongruent-Incongruent 8.4% 7.0% 11.7% 8.3% 
Gratton Effect -.5% 5.0% -4.1% -1.8% 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Experiment 1 response latencies and standard error bars for congruency and n – 1 
congruency. Data with repetitions included on left; data with repetitions excluded on right. 
Figure 2. Experiment 1 percentage errors and standard error bars for congruency and n – 1 
congruency. Data with repetitions included on left; data with repetitions excluded on right. 
Figure 3. Experiment 1 percentage errors and standard error bars for congruency and switch on 
random errors. 
Figure 4. Experiment 2 response latencies and standard error bars for congruency and n – 1 
congruency. Data with repetitions included on left; data with repetitions excluded on right. 
Figure 5. Experiment 2 percentage errors and standard error bars for congruency and n – 1 
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